Ss listened to a man and woman discuss the behaviors of a third, target person. First, however, they received handwritten sets of trait adjectives that each speaker had ostensibly used to describe the target before engaging in the conversation. Ss with the objective of forming an impression of the target person had better recall of behaviors if they were evaluatively inconsistent with the female speaker's trait description of the target. However, the behaviors' consistency with the male speaker's description of the target had little influence. When Ss listened to the conversation with instructions to infer each speaker's impression of the target, they typically had better recall of behaviors that were inconsistent with trait descriptions provided by the particular speaker who mentioned them. When they were told to form impressions of the speakers themselves, however, Ss had generally better recall of the behaviors mentioned by a given speaker when they were inconsistent with the trait description provided by the other speaker. Existing models of person memory and judgment could not account a priori for either these results or for judgments of the target and speakers.
The information we acquire about people is often conveyed in informal conversations. A woman may tell us about someone she met on her vacation or a friend that she wants us to meet. Or, we may listen to people exchange anecdotes about a mutual acquaintance. Later, we may be called on to convey our own impression of the individual who was described. We presumably do this on the basis of a cognitive representation we had formed of the person while listening to the conversation. What is the nature of this representation, and how is it used to arrive at judgments?
The mental representations we form of people from information about their traits and behaviors have been the subject of substantial research and theorizing (for reviews, see Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Wyer & Srull, 1986 . One might therefore expect tentative answers to the above questions to be available. In fact, this is not the case. The vast majority of studies on person memory and judgment have been performed within a rather limited research paradigm. Specifically, subjects are typically instructed to form an impression of someone on the basis of a series of personality trait adjectives followed by a randomized sequence of behavior descriptions that vary in their consistency with these adjectives. The essential information that is conveyed about a person in informal conversations may be similar. However, the processing of this information may be different. For one thing, people who listen to a conversation about someone not only may form an impression of This research was supported by Grant MH 3-8585 from the National Institute of Mental Health.
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Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, 603 East Daniel Street, Champaign, Illinois 61820. the person being discussed, but also may infer the speakers' impressions of this individual. They may also form concepts of the speakers themselves, on the basis of what they say. These concepts are not necessarily independent; one may be used as a basis for another.
In three studies, we investigated the role of these concepts in processing the information conveyed in a conversation and their influence on judgments. In each study, subjects listened to a taped conversation between two persons about a mutual acquaintance. The experiments differed only in the instructions that subjects were given at the start of the conversation (to form an impression of the person being discussed, to infer each speaker's impression of the person, or to form impressions of the speakers). Because of the exploratory nature of the studies, it seemed desirable to construct conditions that would be as similar as possible to those used in earlier studies of person impression formation. Thus, subjects were given trait adjective descriptions of the target that the speakers had ostensibly written down before the conversation took place. Then, in the conversation itself, the speakers exchanged anecdotal accounts of the target's behaviors that were either consistent or inconsistent with the trait descriptions they had provided. Later, all subjects reported their liking for both the speakers and the target person and recalled the behaviors they had heard about. Constraints imposed by the above procedure undoubtedly prevented us from capturing all of the factors that must ultimately be considered in this uncharted area of investigation. However, this procedure helped us to compare more directly the pattern of results we obtained with those observed in previous research, and to evaluate more precisely the implications of those differences that emerged.
Even in the somewhat restricted conditions described above, the way the information is processed and later used to make judgments may differ considerably from the way it would be processed if it were presented in a randomized list. To provide a framework for conceptualizing these differences, we first review several theoretical and empirical conclusions that have typically been drawn from past research on person memory and judgment. We then note certain limitations on their applicability under the conditions we considered. Finally, we present our results and evaluate their implications for subjects' cognitive responses to the information they received and for the representations that they may have formed from it. In doing so, we note several theoretical and empirical issues that models of person memory and judgment must address in order to account for the phenomena we have identified.
Research and Theory in Person Impression Formation
Suppose subjects with the objective of forming an impression of a target person receive initial trait adjective descriptions of the target followed by a series of behaviors the person has performed. Later, they report their liking for the person and recall the person's behavior. The data obtained under such conditions have led to the following theoretical and empirical conclusions:
1. Subjects encode the behaviors in terms of the trait concepts they exemplify, forming "trait-behavior clusters" (Gordon & Wyer, 1987; Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980; Wyer & Gordon, 1982) .
2. Subjects also form a concept of the person as likeable or dislikeable on the basis of the initial (e.g., trait adjective) information and organize the target's behaviors in terms of this concept as well. This central concept is typically used as a basis for later evaluations of the target independently of the implications of the behaviors (Hastie & Park, 1986; Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987; .
3. Behaviors that are evaluatively inconsistent with the central concept that subjects have formed of a person are typically recalled better than behaviors that are consistent with this concept (Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981; Srull, Lichtenstein, &Rothbart, 1985; Wyer & Gordon, 1982) . The recall advantage of inconsistent behaviors is usually attributed to interbehavior associations that subjects form between these behaviors and other ones in the course of trying to resolve their inconsistency (Srull, 1981; . At the same time, inconsistent behaviors may decrease subjects' confidence that their general concept of the target is correct. Consequently, subjects selectively review behaviors they have learned that confirm the validity of this concept. This "bolstering" strengthens the associations between these behaviors and the general target concept and thereby increases their accessibility in memory. The effect of this activity on the recall of behaviors sometimes overrides the effects of inconsistency resolution (Wyer, Budesheim, Lambert, & Martin, 1987; Wyer & Martin, 1986 ).
The cognitive representations that result from the activities described above are typically conveyed metaphorically in associative network terms. Suppose a target person is described by a set of trait adjectives, followed by behaviors that are either evaluatively consistent (C) or evaluatively inconsistent (I) with this description. If the consistent and inconsistent behaviors exemplify traits T c and Ti, respectively, two trait-behavior clusters would be formed. In addition, an evaluative person concept (P) is formed, and the behaviors are organized around this concept as well. These representations would have the form shown Figure 1 . Hypothetical representation of a person, P, based on a set of trait adjective descriptions (T) and behaviors that are evaluatively consistent (C) or inconsistent (I) with these descriptions. Behaviors are presented in the sequence CCIIC. Each inconsistent behavior is assumed to form associations with the two behaviors that immediately precede it in the series. Wider pathways denote stronger associations.
in Figure 1 . The pathways that connect inconsistent behaviors to others in the evaluation-based representation denote associations that result from inconsistency resolution, whereas the wider pathways that connect behaviors to the central concept reflect strong associations that result from bolstering. The ease of recalling a behavior in this representation is theoretically a function of both the strength of its association with the central concept (which depends on the amount of bolstering) and the number of ways it can be accessed (which depends on inconsistency resolution).
Impressions Formed on the Basis of Conversations
Several questions arise concerning the extent to which the above conclusions generalize to impression formation that occurs in the course of informal conversations. For one thing, a conversation is a series of temporally related communicative acts and, therefore, may be represented cognitively as an event sequence. Although the structure of event representations is not fully understood, it is undoubtedly quite different from that of person representations (cf. Allen & Ebbesen, 1981; Wyer, Shoben, Fuhrman, & Bodenhausen, 1985) .
Even assuming that a person representation is formed, sev-eral considerations arise in conceptualizing its content and structure that do not come into play in the usual research paradigm. 1. Subjects who listen to two persons discuss a third (target) person may form two separate concepts of the target, one based on the information provided by each speaker. They may then organize the person's behaviors around the concept that pertains to the speaker who mentioned them. The two speakerbased representations that result from this organization may not be totally independent, however. That is, the behaviors mentioned by one speaker may often be thought about in relation to those mentioned by the other speaker, and therefore the two sets of behaviors may become associated. This is particularly likely when the two speakers' descriptions of the target (and thus the concepts formed on the basis of these descriptions) differ evaluatively.
Suppose, for example, that one speaker, Bob, has described a target favorably and a second, Mary, has described him unfavorably. If Bob then reports an undesirable behavior the target has performed, subjects may mentally review the behaviors that Mary has described to determine whether she knows of similar things the target has done. Alternatively, suppose Bob mentions a favorable behavior. Although this behavior is consistent with Bob's own characterization of the target, it is inconsistent with Mary's description of him. Therefore, subjects may try to determine whether Mary is aware of similar behaviors the target has performed. Alternatively, they may focus on unfavorable behaviors that Mary has mentioned that confirm her negative description of the target. Many other possibilities exist as well. The point is that the behaviors that one speaker mentions may be thought about in relation not only to other behaviors that this speaker has reported but also to behaviors the other speaker has described, leading associations to be formed between these behaviors.
2. People who listen to a conversation may not always respond to it as disinterested observers. Rather, they may focus their attention primarily on one of the two speakers. This may lead them to organize the information they receive around a concept that is based on this speaker's description of the target alone, without regard to the other speaker's characterization of him.
3. Speakers who discuss another person convey information not only about this person but also about themselves. For example, speakers who say nice things about a target may give an impression not only that they like the target but also that they are personally friendly and, therefore, are likeable themselves. Correspondingly, speakers who disparage a target may convey not only that they dislike the target, but also that they are themselves unfriendly and dislikeable. Listeners may often be uncertain about whether a speaker's trait description of a target actually reflects attributes of the target person himself or characteristics of the speaker. Consequently, when the speaker mentions a behavior the target performed, subjects may not only evaluate the behavior's implications for the validity of their own concept of the target, but may also consider whether the speaker's decision to report this behavior is a reflection of the speaker's own likeableness, independently of its implications for the target person.
4. The various concepts that subjects potentially form from the information conveyed in a conversation are likely to be interdependent. For example, subjects may use the speakers' apparent liking for the target as a basis for their own concept of him and also their concept of the speakers. In addition, they may later use their liking for the speakers as a standard of comparison in evaluating the target. This latter tendency may lead subjects to evaluate the target less favorably if they like the speakers than if they dislike them. If subjects' liking for the speakers is, in turn, based on the speakers' trait adjective descriptions of the target, this leads to a somewhat surprising prediction: Subjects will like the target less when speakers have described him favorably than when they have described him unfavorably.
These possibilities are only a few of those that could conceivably arise when information about a person is conveyed in a conversation. Although the present three studies could not distinguish among all these myriad possibilities, they were nevertheless expected to circumscribe the range of viable alternatives. In light of the three different types of concepts that were potentially likely to be formed from information conveyed in a conversation, it seemed desirable to obtain data that would help us to conceptualize the representations that are formed around each. Therefore, we explicitly instructed subjects (in different studies) to form each type of concept.
Method
The present studies were conducted simultaneously as subexperiments within an overall investigation of impression formation in conversations, with subjects being assigned randomly both to experiment and to conditions within each subexperiment. (For other examples of this methodology, see Wyer & Martin, 1986.) In each study, subjects listened to a tape-recorded discussion between two people about a third. Before doing so, however, they were given two sets of trait adjectives that had ostensibly been used by the speakers to describe the person they were going to discuss. In the course of the conversation, both speakers exchanged anecdotal descriptions of the target person's behavior. The behaviors reported by each speaker varied in their descriptive and evaluative consistency with the speaker's general trait adjective characterization of the target. After listening to the conversation, subjects reported their liking for the target, each speaker's liking for the target, and their liking for the speakers. Then, after a short delay, they were asked to recall the behaviors described in the conversation.
The three experiments differed only with respect to the impressions that subjects were told to form while listening to the conversation. In Experiment 1, as in previous research, subjects were told to form an impression of the person being described in the conversation. In the two other experiments, subjects were explicitly instructed either to form impressions of the speakers (Experiment 2) or to infer each speaker's impression of the target (Experiment 3).
Except for the instructions given subjects in the second two experiments and the manner in which the information was conveyed, the stimulus materials and procedure were very similar to those used in previous research on person memory and judgment. First, the target person was male, as in other studies (Srull, 1981 Wyer et al., 1984; Wyer & Martin, 1986) .
1 Third, the behaviors described by each speaker implied a value along either the same dimension as the speaker's initial trait description of the target or along a different dimension (Wyer & Gordon, 1982; Wyer et al., 1984; Wyer & Martin, 1986) . The conformity of these procedural details to those of previous studies placed constraints on the nature of the conversation. These disadvantages, however, were offset by the advantages of permitting a direct comparison of the results reported with those obtained in previous research.
Design and Subjects
The initial trait adjectives that each speaker used to describe the target conveyed that he was kind, unkind, intelligent, or unintelligent. The behaviors mentioned by each speaker, regardless of the speaker's initial trait description of the target, included 3 that exemplified each of the same four traits. (Thus, 6 behaviors exemplified each trait, 3 being mentioned by one speaker and 3 by the other.) The 16 possible combinations of speakers' trait adjective descriptions (4 descriptions by one speaker crossed with 4 descriptions by the other) constituted four stimulus replications of a 2 X 2 between-subjects design involving (a) the evaluative similarity of the two speakers' general descriptions of the target and (b) the dimensional relatedness of these descriptions (whether they were along the same or different trait dimensions). Similarly, the types of behaviors mentioned by each speaker constituted all four levels of a 2 X 2 within-subjects design involving (a) the descriptive relatedness of the behaviors to this speaker's characterization of the target (i.e., whether they implied a value along the same or a different trait dimension as this characterization) and (b) their evaluative consistency with this characterization.
A total of 144 introductory psychology students participated to fulfill a course requirement. Forty-eight of these students were assigned randomly to each subexperiment, with 12 being exposed to each combination of the two between-subjects variables noted above (3 subjects per stimulus replication).
Procedure of Experiment 1
Subjects were introduced to Experiment 1 with instructions that we were concerned with how people use information to form impressions. They were told that (a) in everyday life, we often form impressions of persons on the basis of descriptions that others provide, (b) we had tape recorded several conversations between upper division psychology students who volunteered to spend 5 to 10 min talking about a person they both knew well, and (c) they would be listening to one of these tapes. Subjects were asked to "form as clear an impression of the person being discussed as possible, based on the conversation about him. Later, we will be asking you some questions about the impressions you have formed."
Following this instruction, a portion of the tape was played in which a male and a female student 2 were given instructions for discussing their mutual friend ("Don"). Speakers of different sexes were used to increase the distinctiveness of the voices on the tape. (A verbatim transcript of the tape, containing these instructions and the ensuing conversation, is provided in the Appendix.) About 1 min into the tape, the two speakers were asked to "indicate on a piece of paper three trait adjectives that you think describes Don well." At this point, the tape recording was stopped, and subjects were given photocopies of the three trait adjectives that each speaker had ostensibly written down. The third adjective in each set (active and energetic, in the descriptions attributed to the male and female speakers, respectively) was the same in all conditions. The other two adjectives varied over conditions with respect to the trait dimension to which they were relevant (kindness vs. intelligence) and their evaluative implications (favorable vs. unfavorable). Specifically, the pair attributed to the male speaker implied that the target was either kind (kind and considerate), unkind (cold and unfriendly), intelligent (intelligent and witty), or unintelligent (unintelligent and dense). The same adjective pairs were attributed to the female speaker except when the two speakers' characterizations were evaluatively similar and along the same dimension. In this condition, an alternative pair was attributed to one of the speakers to avoid duplication. (For example, hostile and unkind were ostensibly used by one speaker to describe the target when the other had described him as cold and unfriendly. In such conditions, the specific trait adjectives attributed to each speaker were counterbalanced over subjects.) All 16 combinations of trait descriptions (4 descriptions by the male speaker crossed with 4 descriptions by the female) were therefore represented.
Subjects were given about 30 s to study the two adjective descriptions. Then they were asked to place the form beneath their seat, and the rest of the tape was played. The tone of the conversation was that of two friends discussing someone they had both known for some time. A total of 26 behaviors of the target were reported. The behaviors were drawn from a pool of stimuli used in earlier studies of person memory (e.g., Wyer & Martin, 1986 ), but were slightly modified so they would sound natural in the course of a conversation. Each speaker mentioned 13 behaviors. Of these, 1 was neutral and 3 exemplified each of the 4 alternative traits implied by the initial trait adjective descriptions (i.e., 3 behaviors were kind, 3 were unkind, 3 were intelligent, and 3 were unintelligent). These behaviors, therefore, varied in both their evaluative consistency and their descriptive relatedness to the speaker's initial trait description of the target. However, the particular behaviors that exemplified a given combination of consistency and descriptive relatedness depended on the particular trait description provided. Pooled over the four sets of trait adjective descriptions, each behavior represented each combination of the two variables an equal proportion of times.
Assessment of Dependent Variables
The taped conversation lasted approximately 4 min. When it was over, subjects were told that judgments are "sometimes more reliable when the information has had time to settle" and, on this pretense, were asked to complete a 5-min political science questionnaire, the content of which was unrelated to the current study. After completing this filler task, they were given a one-page questionnaire on which they were asked to estimate (a) how much they liked the target person, (b) how much each speaker liked the target, and (c) how much they personally liked each speaker. All judgments were made along an 11 -category scale from -5 (dislike very much) to +5 (like very much).
Subjects were then told that in order to understand how people form impressions on the basis of information, it would be helpful to know how much of the information they can recall. On this pretense, they were asked to write down on a blank sheet of paper as many of the behaviors that were mentioned in the conversation as they could remember. They were told to write them down in as close to the original ' Some studies (e.g., Hastie, 1980; Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, 1983) have used a smaller number of inconsistent than consistent behaviors. Although this procedure is more ecologically plausible, it introduces a confound of behaviors' inconsistency with set size. Thus, a recall advantage of inconsistent over consistent behaviors occurs to be alternatively interpretable as a von Restorff(1933) effect created by the distinctiveness of the behaviors rather than by inconsistency resolution processes of the sort implied by the model. 2 Appreciation is extended to Janice Kelly and Bob Bontempo for serving as protagonists in the taped version of the conversation. wording as possible, but if they couldn't remember the original wording but could remember the idea, to write that down as well. They were urged to write down everything they could remember regardless of whether they took it into account in forming their impressions. Subjects were given 10 min to complete this task. Upon completing it, they were debriefed and dismissed.
Recalled behaviors were scored according to a gist criterion. That is, responses were scored as correct if they described the behavior conveyed by the original item, regardless of wording. Because previous studies (e.g., Srull, 1981; Wyer & Gordon, 1982) have invariably shown very high interjudge reliability in scoring such behaviors, only a single judge was used, who was unaware of experimental conditions.
Procedure of Experiments 2 and 3
The procedure followed in Experiments 2 and 3 was identical to that used in Experiment 1 except for the initial instructions to subjects concerning the objectives of the study. In Experiment 2, subjects were reminded that "in everyday life, we often form impressions of people based on what they say about others in the course of a conversation." Then, after being told the circumstances surrounding the conversation, they were instructed to "form as clear an impression as you can of each speaker, based on the conversation that you are about to hear."
In Experiment 3, subjects were told that "in everyday life, we often get a feel for what people think about a given individual by listening to what they say about the person in the course of a conversation." Then, after being informed of the circumstances surrounding the conversation they were about to hear, they were told to "form as clear a picture as you can of each speaker's impression of the person they are talking about, based on the conversation that took place."
Preliminary Analyses
Overall analyses were initially performed on both recall and judgment data from all three experiments in combination. The proportion of behaviors recalled, for example, was analyzed as a function of instructional conditions (experiment), the evaluative similarity of the two speakers' trait descriptions of the target, the dimensional relatedness of these descriptions (whether the descriptions were along the same or different trait dimensions), which speaker mentioned the behaviors, the evaluative consistency of the behaviors with the description by the speaker who mentioned them, and the descriptive relatedness of the behaviors to this description (whether the behaviors had implication for the same trait described by the speaker or a different one). This analysis yielded an interaction of the evaluative similarity of the two speakers' descriptions of the target and the evaluative consistency of the recalled behaviors with the trait description provided by the speaker who mentioned them, F{\, 132) = 6.84, p < .05. This interaction indicated that when the two speakers' descriptions were evaluatively similar, behaviors were recalled better if they were inconsistent with these descriptions that if they were consistent with them (.442 vs. .386). When the two speakers' descriptions were evaluatively dissimilar, however, they were recalled better if they were consistent with the description provided by the speaker who mentioned them (.465 vs. .432). Moreover, this interaction was qualified by higher order interactions of the two variables and (a) instructional set (experiment) alone, F(l, 132) = 3.11, p< .05, and (b) instructional set, the dimensional relatedness of the two speakers' descriptions of the target, and the speaker who mentioned the behavior, F{2,132) = 3.02, p < .05. (Several other significant interactions did not involve the consistency of the behaviors with the speakers' descriptions and were not of theoretical interest.) An analysis of other recall indices and judgment data also yielded effects involving instructional set. Those effects of particular theoretical relevance are noted presently.
These overall analyses confirmed our a priori suspicions that the sorts of representations that subjects form from information in a conversation, and the judgments they make, depend on their specific objectives at the time they receive the information. Moreover, they justified our analysis of the data obtained in each experiment separately. Unless otherwise noted, the proportion of behaviors recalled in each experiment was analyzed as a function of the variables noted above. Other recall and judgment indices were analyzed as a function of the favorableness of each speaker's description of the target and the trait dimension to which these descriptions were relevant (kindness or intelligence).
Experiment 1: Forming Impressions of Target Persons
In Experiment 1, subjects listened to the conversation with instructions to form an impression of the person that the speakers were discussing. As noted earlier, however, subjects in this situation may be uncertain about whether the speakers' trait descriptions actually reflected characteristics of the target or whether they are attributable in part to characteristics of the speakers themselves (i.e., the speakers' idiosyncratic liking for the target or their own general likeableness). Therefore, they may spontaneously form concepts of the speakers, or of the speakers' liking for the target, as well as of the target himself. The recall and judgment data, considered in combination, were expected to permit some tentative conclusions concerning these possibilities as well as the nature of the representations that were formed from the information presented.
Results

Organization of Behaviors in Memory
In our initial speculations about the type of cognitive representations that would be formed, we considered four general possibilities: (a) Subjects would represent the conversation as a temporally ordered event sequence; (b) they would organize the behaviors around trait concepts; (c) they would organize the behaviors around separate concepts of the target, each formed from the trait description provided by a different speaker; and (d) they would organize the behaviors with respect to a single concept, based on either only one speaker's description of the target or both speakers' descriptions in combination. Some insight into these possibilities may be gained from the type and order of the behaviors that subjects recalled.
Effects of temporal order. Suppose the behaviors mentioned in the conversation are represented as a temporally ordered sequence of communicative acts. Then, subjects should recall the behaviors in the order they occur in this sequence (Allen & Ebbesen, 1981; Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; . To examine this possibility, we assigned a rank to each behavior recalled by a given subject that corresponded to its relative temporal position in the conversation. (In doing so, we considered only those behaviors that subjects recalled. Thus, the recalled behavior that had been mentioned earliest in the conversation was assigned a rank of 1, the recalled behavior that occurred next earliest was assigned a rank of 2, etc.). These ranks were then correlated with the order in which the behaviors were recalled. (A positive correlation, therefore, indicated a positive relation between the order in which behaviors were recalled and the order in which they were mentioned in the conversation.) This correlation, computed for each subject separately and averaged over subjects, was negligible (M = -.035). We analyzed these correlations (after transforming them to Fisher's Z) as a function of the favorableness of each speaker's characterization of the target and the dimensional relatedness of these characterizations. The correlations were more positive when speakers' trait adjective descriptions of the target were along different dimensions (M = .076) then when they were along the same dimension (M = -.146), F(\, 32) = 7.53, p < .01. In neither case, however, was the correlation sufficiently high to conclude that the behaviors were recalled by searching through a temporally ordered event sequence.
Organization of behaviors by trait concept.
According to the formulation proposed by Srull and Wyer (1989;  see also Gordon & Wyer, 1987) , subjects encode and organize behaviors around the trait concepts that they exemplify, forming trait-behavior clusters of the sort shown in Figure 1 . Suppose these clusters are retrieved and used as bases for recalling the behaviors contained in them. Then, behaviors that exemplify the same trait should be recalled in closer proximity to one another than behaviors that exemplify different traits (cf. Hamilton et al., 1980) . To examine this possibility, we coded the behaviors recalled by each subject in terms of the trait they implied (kind, unkind, intelligent, or unintelligent) and computed an adjusted ratio of clustering (ARC) on the basis of this coding (Roenker, Thompson, & Brown, 1971 ) . 4 Interpretable values of this index vary in value from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating chance clustering. The overall level of clustering, computed for each subject separately and averaged over subjects, was only .038, which was not statistically different from 0 (F < 1). Thus, in contrast to the implications of previous person memory research (cf. Hamilton et al., 1980) , there did not appear to be appreciable organization of the behaviors by trait category.
5 Clustering by evaluative category (favorable vs. unfavorable) was somewhat greater (mean ARC = .093), F(l, 32) = 3.95, p < .05. The influence of this organizational criterion, however, is not implied by existing models of person memory.
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Organization of behaviors into independent speaker-specific representations. Suppose subjects form a separate concept of the target on the basis of each speaker's initial trait adjective description of him, and organize the behaviors mentioned by the speaker in terms of this concept. This activity could lead to the construction of two independent person representations. If this is the case, subjects should typically retrieve and report the behaviors in one representation before searching for behaviors contained in the other. In order to examine this possibility, the behaviors recalled by each subject were coded in terms of whether they had been mentioned by the male speaker or the female speaker, and the ARC was computed on the basis of this coding. The overall level of clustering by speaker, computed for each subject separately and averaged over subjects, was .017, which was not significantly different from 0 (F < 1). Moreover, this index did not significantly depend on whether the two speakers' descriptions of the target were evaluatively similar or dissimilar(-.001 vs. .035), p> .10.
Thus, these data call into question the hypothesis that independent representations of the target were formed around concepts that were specific to each speaker.
Organization of behaviors around a single person concept. A further possibility we considered was that subjects would organize the behaviors mentioned in the conversation in terms of a single person concept. Such a concept could be defined on the basis of either (a) trait adjective descriptions of the target provided by both speakers considered in combination, or (b) the description provided by only one of the speakers. It seems reasonable to suppose that if the concept formed is of the target, and if this concept has evaluative implications, the recall pattern would be similar to that observed in other studies of person impression formation (see . That is, behaviors should be better recalled if they are evaluatively inconsistent with subjects' concept of the target than if they are consistent with it.
A concept of the target that is based on the combined implications of both speakers' trait adjective descriptions should have clear evaluative implications only when the two descriptions are similar in favorableness. Under these conditions, however, behaviors were recalled only nonsignificantly better when they were inconsistent with the speakers' descriptions (M = .448) than when they were consistent with them (M = .417; F < 1). When the speakers' trait descriptions of the target were evalua- 4 The computational formula, applied in this context, is as follows:
ARC = R -E(R) N-K-E(R)'
where R is the number of times that two behaviors from the same speaker were recalled consecutively, E(R) is the expected number of such repetitions, N is the number of all items recalled, and K is the number of speakers (in this case, two). E(R) = (Sm(i) 2 /N) -1, where m is the number of behaviors mentioned by speaker;' that were recalled.
5 Clustering by trait was significantly greater when a speaker described the target negatively than when he or she described him positively: In the case of each speaker,. 13 vs. -.05, F( 1, 32) > 4.90, p < .05. The interpretation of this finding is unclear. In any event, it is worth noting that a trait-based organization of the behaviors was more evident in Experiments 2 and 3. An overall analysis that included all three instructional conditions revealed that clustering by trait category was significantly less in Experiment 1 than when subjects were asked to infer speakers' impressions (Experiment 2) (.163) or to form impressions of the speakers themselves (Experiment 3) (. 155), F(2,96) = 3.14, p < .05. 6 Clustering by evaluative category, as well as trait-based clustering, could be partly the result of cueing of semantically and evaluatively similar behaviors at the time of retrieval rather than to an organization of these behaviors at the time of input (Srull, 1984; Wyer & Srull, 1988) . tively dissimilar, a concept of the target that is based on both descriptions in combination would be relatively neutral. Consequently, the recall of behaviors should not depend on the descriptions provided by the particular speakers who mentioned them. In fact, the recall advantage of behaviors that were inconsistent with the description provided by the speaker who mentioned them was slightly greater in this condition (.476 vs. .423) than it was when the two speakers' descriptions were evaluatively similar! The overall difference in the recall of behaviors that were inconsistent vs. consistent with the trait descriptions provided by the speaker who mentioned them (.462 vs. .420) was not significant, F(\, 44) = 2.34, p > .10. Therefore, these data also do not support the hypothesis that behaviors were organized around a concept that was formed from both speakers' trait descriptions in combination.
There is an additional possibility, however. Suppose subjects formed a different concept on the basis of each speaker's description of the target, but they thought about the behaviors mentioned in the conversation with reference to only one of these concepts. Then, the recall of these behaviors should be primarily a function of their evaluative consistency with this concept alone, regardless of which speaker actually mentioned them. To examine this possibility, we coded the behaviors mentioned by each speaker in terms of their consistency with both the male speaker's trait description and the female speaker's description. (When the two speakers' descriptions were evaluatively similar, a behavior's consistency with one speaker's description was the same as its consistency with the other's. When the two descriptions were evaluatively dissimilar, however, a behavior that was evaluatively consistent with one speaker's description was evaluatively inconsistent with the other's.)
The proportion of behaviors recalled of each type is conveyed in Table 1 as a function of the speaker who mentioned them. Note that the two cells of the main diagonal in Table 1 , in which the behaviors are either consistent with both speakers' descriptions or inconsistent with both, refer to conditions in which the two speakers' descriptions of the target were evaluatively similar. The two off-diagonal cells, in which the behaviors are consistent with one speaker's description but inconsistent with the other's, refer to conditions in which the two speakers' descriptions were evaluatively dissimilar. An inherent confound exists in this design between (a) the effect of the consistency of behaviors with one speaker's description of the target and (b) an interaction of the evaluative similarity of the two speakers' descriptions and the behaviors' consistency with the other speaker's description. This interaction, however, did not seem theoretically meaningful on a priori grounds, and so the first, more parsimonious interpretation of the effect was assumed.
The data in Table 1 reveal that the recall of the behaviors was affected primarily by their consistency with the female speaker's characterization of the target, regardless of which speaker had actually mentioned these behaviors. This conclusion is confirmed by an analysis of the proportion of behaviors recalled as a function of the speaker who mentioned them (male vs. female), their evaluative consistency with the female speaker's description of the target, the evaluative similarity of the two speakers' descriptions, and the dimensional relatedness of these descriptions. This analysis yielded only a main effect of Comparable effects of behaviors' consistency with the male speaker's trait descriptions of the target were not evident, however. Specifically, behaviors were recalled no differently when they were evaluatively inconsistent with the male speaker's description of the target (M = .432) than when they were consistent with it (M = .450) (F < 1), and this did not significantly depend on whether the behaviors were reported by the male speaker himself (.388 vs. .430) or by the female speaker (.476 vs. .469). In fact, an analysis of the proportion of behaviors recalled as a function of the speaker who mentioned them, their evaluative consistency with the male speaker's general characterization of the target, and the dimensional relatedness of the male speaker's characterization of the target to the female speaker's yielded no significant effects whatsoever. The implications of these results for the structure of the representations that were formed are noted in the Discussion.
Judgments
The recall data suggest that the target's behaviors were processed more extensively, and therefore recalled better, if they were inconsistent with an evaluative concept that was based on the female speaker's initial trait adjective description. However, they do not indicate whether this concept pertained to the target person, to the speaker's impression of the target, or to the speaker herself. Judgment data, summarized in Table 2 as a function of each speaker's description of the target, provide indirect evidence concerning these possibilities. As noted earlier, judgments were analyzed as a function of the favorableness of each speaker's description of the target and whether these descriptions were along the same or different dimensions. The dimensional relatedness of the two speakers' trait descriptions of the target was typically not a contingency in the results to be reported, and so its effects were not tabulated.
Subjects' inferences of speakers' liking for the target. Subjects' estimates of each speaker's liking for the target increased with the favorableness of the speaker's trait adjective characterization of him: For the male speaker, F( 1, 32) = 29.94, p < .01; for the female speaker, F(l, 32) = 18.67, p < .01. These effects simply validate our manipulation of the favorableness of the two speakers' trait descriptions. They are nevertheless noteworthy in light of the recall data. That is, the evidence that behaviors were apparently thought about in terms of their consistency with only the female speaker's description of the target cannot be attributed to the fact that subjects were insensitive to the male speaker's description of him. In fact, they were at least as sensitive to it as they were to the female speaker's description.
Subjects' liking for the speakers. Speakers were liked better if they described the target favorably than if they described him unfavorably: In the case of the male speaker, 1.29 vs. .16, F\l, 32) = 4.96, p < .05; in the case of the female speaker, 1.54 vs. . 12, F(l, 32) = 6.61, p < .01. Thus, the favorableness of each speaker's trait description of the target had a positive influence on the evaluative concept that subjects formed of the speaker. This influence was somewhat less when the other speaker's description of the target was favorable than when it was unfavorable. However, the interactions implied by this contingency were only marginally significant, F(\, 32) = 2.46, p > .10, and F( 1,32) = 3.86, p < .06, for liking of the male and female speakers, respectively.
Subjects' liking for the target. If subjects have formed an evaluative concept of the target on the basis of the speakers' initial trait adjective descriptions of him, they should theoretically base their liking for the target on this concept (cf. . That is, they should like the target more when the speakers described him favorably than when they did not. This was not the case. The favorableness of each speaker's description had, if anything, a contrast effect on subjects' liking for the target. Although neither speaker's trait description had a significant effect on target evaluations (p > .10), the effects appear to have been additive. Subjects' liking for the target was greater when both speakers' descriptions of him were unfavorable (M = .75) than when both descriptions were favorable (Af = -.33),F(1,32) = 3.39,p< .10. When only one speaker's characterization was favorable, target evaluations fell in between these extremes. Although these effects are not strong, they are similar for both speakers and are consistent with tendencies detected in Experiment 2. In any event, subjects clearly did not base their judgments on an evaluative concept of the target that was formed from the initial information about him (i.e., speakers' initial trait descriptions of him). This conclusion contradicts that drawn on the basis of previous person memory and judgment research (Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Dreben, Fiske, & Hastie, 1979; Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987; .
Discussion
The recall and judgment data that we obtained in this study differ in several respects from those that are typically obtained when subjects form impressions of a person on the basis of similar information that is presented out of its social context. Al-though some aspects of our results must be interpreted with caution, several hypotheses were clearly disconfirmed.
1. The behaviors that were mentioned in the course of the conversation were not represented as a temporally ordered sequence of communicative acts. If they had been, they would have been recalled in the order they were mentioned. They were not.
2. There was little evidence that subjects encoded and organized the behaviors presented in terms of the trait concept they exemplified (or, at least, that this organization affected the recall of these behaviors). If anything, they organized them into evaluative categories (favorable vs. unfavorable).
3. The target's behaviors were not organized around a general evaluative concept that was based on both speakers' characterizations of the target in combination.
4. Subjects did not form two totally independent cognitive representations, each containing behaviors mentioned by a different speaker.
5. The concepts) around which subjects organized the behaviors are unlikely to have pertained to the target person himself. Although subjects may have formed a concept of the target at the time they heard the conversation, this concept was not based on the speakers' initial trait descriptions of him. Subjects liked the target nonsignificantly less when the speakers' trait descriptions of him were favorable than when they were unfavorable.
8 If subjects formed a concept of the target at all as they listened to the conversation, this concept was apparently based on the implications of the individual behaviors described in the conversation, the net implications of which were relatively neutral.
This conclusion should be viewed in the context of evidence that speakers' trait descriptions of the target did have a positive influence on subjects' inferences that the speakers liked the target. They also affected subjects' liking for the speakers. This combination of findings has two possible interpretations. First, subjects may have inferred speakers' liking for the target from their general trait descriptions of him, and these inferences may have mediated subjects' liking for the speakers. Alternatively, subjects may have formed concepts of the speakers directly from their descriptions of the target, reasoning that people who characterize others in favorable terms are likable whereas people who disparage others are dislikable. In either event, when subjects were asked to indicate their own liking for the target, they based their judgments on neither the favorableness of the speakers' trait descriptions per se nor their perceptions that the speakers liked him. Rather, they appeared to use their concepts of the speakers' likableness as standards of comparisons in evaluating the target's likeableness, producing the marginally significant contrast effect that we observed.
A second, quite different interpretation of this latter effect is worth noting. Subjects who learn that a speaker has described the target either favorably or unfavorably may expect the speaker to try to justify this description in the course of the conversation. When they hear the speaker mention behaviors of the target that are inconsistent with the description, they may conclude that the speaker is having difficulty providing this justification and, therefore, that the target does not really have the characteristics the speaker attributed to him. This could also account for the apparent contrast effect of speakers' trait descriptions on subjects' target evaluations.
The most provocative aspect of our results concerns asymmetric effects of speakers on the recall of behaviors. Behaviors had a recall advantage if they were inconsistent with the female speaker's description of the target, and this was true regardless of who actually mentioned the behaviors. In contrast, the behaviors' consistency with the male speaker's description of the target had no influence on their recall. This asymmetry does not indicate that subjects were insensitive to the male speaker's description of the target or that the female speaker was particularly "dynamic" and attention getting. That is, the male and female speakers' initial trait descriptions had similar effects not only on subjects' inferences that they liked the target but also on subjects' liking for the speakers (see Table 2 ). Nor is the asymmetry due to idiosyncratic characteristics of the stimulus tape; it was not evident in Experiments 2 and 3, in which the same tape was used (see Footnote 8).
A more interesting possibility is that people who listen to a conversation have a general tendency to focus their attention on one of the two participants rather than taking the perspective of a disinterested third party. This in itself does not explain why subjects focused on the female speaker in particular. The target, however, was male. Perhaps people are more inclined to think about a person's behaviors with reference to a description provided by someone of the opposite sex than a characterization by someone of the same sex. To clarify these matters, one would need to vary the sex of the target person and present conversations between speakers of the same sex as well as speakers of different sexes. This is difficult to do without introducing further confounds. (That is, many behaviors may be more typical of one sex than of the other. Moreover, speakers of the same sex may be similar in speech style and tonality, leading to confusion as to the source of the behaviors conveyed in the conversation.) Resolution of these ambiguities must await further research.
In any event, it seems clear that subjects did not use the speakers' trait adjective descriptions of the target to form a concept of him. Rather, they used the descriptions to infer either the speakers' liking for the target or the likableness of the speakers themselves. Moreover, concepts formed in the course of making these latter inferences appear to have provided the basis for subjects' organization of the behavioral information presented. This latter possibility increases the desirability of understanding the way this information is processed when subjects are explicitly instructed to think about it with reference to the speakers rather than the target. Experiments 2 and 3 addressed this matter.
Experiment 2: Forming Impressions of Speakers
Subjects in Experiment 1 used the speakers' trait descriptions of the target to infer the likableness of the speakers themselves. 8 It may be noted in passing that the pattern of judgments obtained in this study is also not entirely compatible with predictions based on cognitive balance theory (Heider, 1958) . According to balance principles, subjects should like the target person either if they like the speakers and believe that the speakers like the target, or if they dislike the speakers and believe that the speakers dislike the target. Although our data are consistent with the second of these predictions, they are inconsistent with the first. This means that they attributed these descriptions, at least in part, to characteristics of the speakers rather than of the target alone. This attributional tendency should also be apparent when subjects are explicitly told to form impressions of the speakers. As we have noted, however, subjects may nevertheless be uncertain that the speakers' trait descriptions of the target actually reflect characteristics of the speakers themselves rather than attributes of the target. When subjects' primary objective is to form impressions of the speakers, subjects may make a more concerted effort to validate their attributions than they did in Experiment 1. In doing so, they may consider the consistency of each speaker's description of the target, and the behaviors he or she reports, with the information the other speaker provides. This information may include both the latter speaker's trait description of the target and the behaviors that the speaker mentions subsequently.
The possible effects of this information are implied by attribution theory (Kelley, 1967) . That is, a speaker's trait description of the target is more likely to be attributed to a general disposition of the speaker when there is no consensus regarding its evaluative or descriptive implications for characteristics of the target. In other words, it is more likely to be attributed to a characteristic of the speaker when the other speaker's description of the target is evaluatively dissimilar to it. For similar reasons, behaviors the other speaker mentions that are evaluatively inconsistent with the first speaker's characterization of the target provide further confirmation that this characterization is not accurate and, therefore, that it reflects a general disposition of the speaker to describe others either favorably or unfavorably. (Note that behaviors the speaker mentions that are inconsistent with his or her own trait description of the target may also call into question the validity of the speaker's description of the target. The implications of this inconsistency for the speaker's likableness, however, are less clear.) When subjects' objective is to confirm the validity of their concept of the speaker, they may consider these factors, and the effects of these considerations may be reflected both in their judgments of the speaker and in the types of behaviors they recall. As will be seen, this was in fact the case.
Results
Organization of Behaviors in Memory
Effects of temporal order. There was once again no evidence that subjects represented the information conveyed in the conversation as a temporally organized event sequence. The mean correlation between recall order and the order in which behaviors were mentioned in the conversation, computed as in Experiment 1, was negligible (r = -.027, p > . 10) and was not contingent on the type and relatedness of the speakers' trait adjective descriptions.
Organization around trait concepts. The clustering of recalled behaviors in terms of trait concepts (mean ARC = .155) was significantly greater than 0, F(l, 32) = 13.47, p < .01, as was clustering according to favorableness (mean ARC = .172), F{\, 32) = 11.45, p < .01. Thus, unlike Experiment 1, subjects in this study appeared to encode and organize the behaviors in terms of both trait and evaluative criteria.
Organization around speaker-related concepts. The overall level of clustering of recalled behaviors according to the speaker who reported them was low (M = -.029) and nonsignificant (F < 1). Unlike previous experiments, some significant but generally uninterpretable main and interaction effects occurred involving the similarity of the two speakers' characterizations of the target and the specific dimensions to which these descriptions pertained. In no case, however, was the level of clustering sufficiently high to warrant the conclusion that totally independent speaker-based representations were formed.
This does not mean, however, that the behaviors were not organized around two different speaker-related concepts. Perhaps subjects formed two concepts, but they thought about the behaviors mentioned by one speaker in relation to behaviors mentioned by the other, thereby forming associations between the behaviors in one set and those in the other. In fact, this appears to have been the case. Table 3 shows the mean proportion of behaviors recalled as a function of the speaker who mentioned them, their consistency with this speaker's characterization for the target, and the evaluative similarity and dimensional relatedness of the two speakers' characterizations. Unlike Experiment 1, the effects of this variable on the recall of behaviors were generally similar regardless of which speaker mentioned the behaviors.
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When the two speakers' general trait descriptions of the target were evaluatively similar, behaviors were recalled better if they were inconsistent with these descriptions (M = .444) than if they were consistent with them (M = .392). When the two speakers' general characterizations of the target differed in favorableness, however, behaviors were better recalled if they were consistent with the description of the target by the speaker who reported them (A/ = .520) than if they were inconsistent with it (M = .410). These conclusions were confirmed by an interaction of the behaviors' consistency with the trait description provided by the speaker who mentioned them and the evaluative similarity of the two speakers' descriptions, F( 1,44) = 8.65, p < .01. The difference between this interaction and those obtained in Experiments 1 and 3 was confirmed by a higher order interaction involving the same two variables and experiment, F(2, 132) = 3.11,/?<.05.
A simpler interpretation of this interaction, however, bears directly on our speculation that subjects pay particular attention to information that confirms the evaluative concepts they have formed of the speakers. Note that when the two speakers' descriptions of the target were dissimilar, behaviors that were consistent with the description provided by the speaker who mentioned them were inconsistent with the other speaker's description. Thus, the interactive effects described above may simply indicate that the behaviors mentioned by one speaker were generally recalled better when they were inconsistent with the other speaker's trait description of the target than when they were consistent with it, and this was true regardless of whether the two speakers' trait characterizations of the target were evaluatively similar (.444 vs. .392) or different (.520 vs. .410) . (This main effect is statistically equivalent to the interaction described above.) In other words, subjects had better memory for the behaviors a speaker mentioned that called into question the accuracy of the other speaker's trait description of the target, and, therefore, confirmed the assumption that this description reflected the latter speaker's general likeableness.
Judgments
Speakers' liking for the target. Subjects' judgments of speakers' liking for the target are presented in the top two sections of Table 4 . Both speakers were perceived to like the target more when their trait adjective description of him was favorable than when it was unfavorable: In the case of the male speaker, 1.95 versus .29, F\\, 32) = 12.40, p < .04; in the case of the female speaker, 1.46 versus-.42,^1,32) = 12.05,p<.01.
Unlike other experiments, however, subjects inferred a speaker to like the target less when the other speaker's characterization of the target was favorable than when it was unfavorable: In the case of male speaker, .46 versus 1.79, F( 1,32) = 7.94, p < .01; in the case of the female speaker, .12 versus .92, F\\, 32) = 2.15, p >. 10. There are two interpretations of this finding. First, subjects who were told explicitly to form impressions of the two speakers may have been disposed to compare one speaker with the other. This comparison process may have lead the implications of one speaker's trait description to be evaluated in relation to those of the other speaker's description, producing a contrast effect of the sort described above.
The second interpretation is suggested by the fact that the effect of one speaker's (A's) description of the target on judgments of the second speaker (B) is equivalent to an interaction of B's own description of the target and the evaluative similarity of this description to A's. Thus, the effect of the female speaker's description of the target on inferences that the male speaker liked him can alternatively be interpreted as evidence that the male speaker's description of the target had a more positive effect on inferences that he liked the target when the female speaker disagreed with this description (2.58 vs. -.42) than when she agreed with it (1.33 vs. 1.00). Correspondingly, the female speaker's description of the target had more influence on inferences that she liked him when the male speaker's description evaluatively differed from hers (1.67 vs. -1.00) than when it was similar (1.25 vs.. 16). A possible explanation of this contingency is provided below.
Subjects' liking for speakers. In Experiment 1, subjects' liking for the speakers was influenced by speakers' trait characterizations of the target. Although this influence also occurred in the present experiment, the effects of the two speakers' descriptions of the target were not independent.
Although subjects liked each speaker somewhat more when the speaker's description of the target was favorable than when it was unfavorable (for the male speaker, 1.12 vs. .50; for the female speaker, .50 vs. -.12), in neither case was this difference significant {p >. 10). On the other hand, subjects' liking for each speaker was affected negatively by the other speaker's description of the target: In the case of liking for the male speaker, F( 1, 32) = 2.41, p < . 10; in the case of liking for the female speaker, F(l, 32) = 8.06, p < .01. These effects, like the corresponding effects on inferences that a speaker liked the target, have two interpretations. First, they may reflect the use of each speaker's description (or its implications) as a standard of comparison in construing the implications of the other's description. Alternatively, they may indicate that each speaker's trait description of the target had more influence on subjects' liking for this speaker when it differed from the other speaker's description of him.
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These effects may be a result of the attribution processes mentioned earlier. That is, when the evaluative implications of speakers' trait descriptions of the target showed little consensus concerning the likableness of the target, subjects were more inclined to attribute these descriptions to characteristics of the speakers themselves. Consequently, these descriptions had more effect on both subjects' inferences that the speakers liked the target and subjects' liking for the speakers.
Subjects' liking for the target. The results of Experiment 1, in which the favorableness of speakers' descriptions of the target had (nonsignificant) contrast effects on subjects' liking for him, suggested that subjects used the evaluative concepts they had spontaneously formed of the speakers as comparative standards in reporting their liking for the target person. As noted above, however, subjects' liking for the speakers in the present study was affected less positively by the speakers' characterizations of the target than they were in Experiment 1. Consequently, contrast effects of these characterizations on subjects' liking for the target should be correspondingly less pronounced. This appears to have been the case. The data in the last section of Table 4 show some evidence of a contrast effect of each speaker's description of the target on subjects' liking for the target. However, the effects are small and nonsignificant (p >. 10). The difference in liking when both speakers' descriptions were favorable (M = -.50) versus unfavorable (M = .16) was also not reliable 
Discussion
Subjects in Experiment 2, like those in Experiment 1, did not represent the behaviors mentioned as a temporally ordered event sequence. Nor did they form speaker-specific representations that were totally independent of one another. (This conclusion is based on the negligible clustering of recalled behaviors in terms of the speaker who mentioned them.) Rather, associations were formed between the behaviors contained in one speakerorganized set and those in the other.
In combination, the recall and judgment data obtained in Experiment 2 suggest a quite plausible interpretation of the processes that underlie subjects' responses to the information they received. This interpretation is based on considerations raised earlier. Specifically, subjects with the goal of evaluating the speakers formed an initial concept of each speaker as likable or dislikable on the basis of the speaker's trait description of the target. They were nevertheless uncertain about whether a given speaker's description of the target reflected a general disposition of this speaker to respond favorably or unfavorably to others (and, therefore, the speaker's likableness) or attributes of the target. Therefore, they used information provided by the other speaker (both the other speaker's general characterization of the target and the behaviors that he or she mentioned subsequently) to confirm their assumption that the concept they had formed was correct. Specifically, they attributed a speaker's trait description of the target to a general disposition of the speaker to a greater extent when the other speaker's description of him had different evaluative implications and therefore provided no consensus regarding the target's likeableness. Consequently, each speaker's description of the target had a significantly greater effect on liking for this speaker when it differed from the other speaker's description than when the two speaker's descriptions were similar. In addition, subjects were particularly sensitive to behaviors the other speaker mentioned that confirmed their assumption that the speaker's trait description of the target actually reflected a characteristic of the speaker. Behaviors that were evaluatively inconsistent with this description, thereby suggesting that it might not be an accurate general characterization of the target's personality and likeableness, provided this confirmation. Consequently, subjects thought about these hypothesis-confirming behaviors more extensively than other, disconfirming behaviors (cf. Snyder & Cantor, 1979) , and this additional processing gave the behaviors a recall advantage later.
The implications of this interpretation for the kinds of cognitive representations that were formed from the information will be considered in the General Discussion. However, it seems justifiable to conclude that in Experiment 2, as in Experiment 1, the central concepts around which the target's behaviors were organized did not pertain to the target person himself. The favorableness of the speakers' descriptions of the target had nonsignificant contrast effects on subjects' reported liking for the target, just as it did in the first experiment. Subjects in both experiments appear to have thought about the behaviors mentioned in the conversation with reference to concepts they formed of the speakers, or of speakers' impressions of the target, rather than to a concept of the target. To this extent, a question arises as to why the attribution processes we identified in Experiment 2 were not also evident in Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, where subjects were not explicitly told to form concepts of the speakers, they appear to have focused their attention on only one of the two speakers rather than considering their concepts of the speakers in relation to one another. One implication of this interpretation is that the attribution processes that appeared evident in Experiment 2 do not occur spontaneously. That is, they occur only when subjects are explicitly told to form impressions of the speakers and therefore have an extrinsic incentive to make accurate assessments of the implications of both speakers' target characterizations. This possibility may be worth investigating.
Experiment 3: Inferring Speakers' Impressions
When subjects are told to form impressions of the speakers in a conversation, they may regard the speakers' descriptions of the target's behavior as favorable or unfavorable communicative acts that either confirm or disconfirm their perceptions of the speakers' likableness. In Experiment 3, subjects received the information for the purpose of inferring speakers' impressions of the target. In this case, the behaviors may be interpreted in a different way. Suppose subjects have formed a concept of the speaker as someone who either likes or dislikes the target, on the basis of the speaker's trait description of him. When the speaker later mentions a behavior that is evaluatively inconsistent with this concept, subjects may try to understand why the speaker would say something bad about someone he or she likes (or, alternatively, would say something good about a person he or she dislikes). The cognitive activities that subjects perform in an attempt to gain this understanding may not be the same as those that occur when subjects try to form their own impressions of the target. Although we had no a priori expectations concerning the nature of this difference, the possibility that subjects' own liking for the target might often be mediated by their perceptions of speakers' liking for him made it seem worth exploring.
Results
Organization of Behaviors in Memory
Effects of temporal order. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the mean correlation between the order in which behaviors were recalled and the order they occurred in the conversation was -.03l(p>A0).
Organization around trait concepts. In this study, as in Experiment 2, subjects appeared to encode and organize the behaviors in terms of the trait concepts they exemplified (see Footnote 4). That is, the degree of clustering by trait category (mean ARC = .199) was significantly greater than 0, F\l, 32) = 8.58, p < .01. The evaluative implications of the behaviors may also have played a role in their organization. Although the clustering of the behaviors by evaluative category (mean ARC =.112) was not reliable, F(l, 32) = 3.10, p < .09, it was comparable in magnitude to the significant effect obtained in Experiments 1 and 2.
Organization around speaker-related concepts. The overall level of clustering of recalled behaviors by the speaker who mentioned them was below chance (Af = -.151) and did not significantly depend either on the evaluative similarity of the two speakers' descriptions or on whether these descriptions were along the same or different trait dimensions. These data, therefore, once again argue against the possibility that two entirely independent speaker-based representations were formed. Table 5 shows the proportion of behaviors recalled as a function of the speaker who reported them, their consistency with this speaker's trait descriptions of the target, the evaluative similarity of the two speakers' trait descriptions, and whether the descriptions were along the same or different trait dimensions. With one exception, the behaviors a speaker had reported enjoyed a recall advantage if they were inconsistent with this speaker's trait adjective description of the target. The exception occurred when the two speakers' trait descriptions of the target represented opposite poles of the same dimension. In this condition, subjects had particularly good recall of behaviors that were consistent with the description provided by the speaker who mentioned them (and, therefore, disconfirmed the other speaker's characterization of him). This pattern of effects is reflected statistically by an interaction among behaviors' consistency with the speaker's description of the target, the dimensional relatedness of the two speakers' characterizations, and the evaluative similarity of the descriptions, F(l, 44) = 6.57, p < .01. This interaction did not depend on which speaker mentioned the behaviors (F < 1). Note that these results differ substantially from those obtained in Experiment 1, when subjects were asked to form their own impressions of the target. For example, when the two speakers' descriptions of the target in the earlier experiment were bipolar opposites, subjects recalled behaviors slightly better if they were inconsistent with the target description provided by the speaker who mentioned them than if they were consistent with this description (.500 vs. .450). (A lower order interaction between the recalled behaviors' consistency with the speaker's description and the evaluatively similarity of the two speakers' descriptions was also significant in this experiment, F( 1,44) = 4.04, p< .05, but not in Experiment .
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.452 1 (F < 1). Moreover, as noted in our description of the preliminary analyses, this interaction was reliably different over all three experiments). In addition to the effects described above, a significant interaction occurred involving the speaker who mentioned the behaviors (male or female), the consistency of the recalled behaviors with this speaker's trait description of the target, and the descriptive relatedness of these behaviors to the speaker's description, F{1,44) = 5.17, p < .05. Behaviors the male speaker had mentioned enjoyed a recall advantage if they were inconsistent with this speaker's general characterization of the target regardless of their descriptive relation to this characterization. In contrast, behaviors the female speaker had mentioned had a recall advantage when they were inconsistent with her trait characterization of the target only if these behaviors and her characterization had implications along the same trait dimension. This contingency was not apparent in Experiments 1 and 2 and has no clear interpretation, so we will not discuss it further.
In summary, the behaviors a speaker mentioned were organized around a concept that pertained to this particular speaker. On the other hand, the evidence that recalled behaviors were not clustered by speaker indicates that the behaviors mentioned by one speaker were often thought about in relation to behaviors that were mentioned by the other. A more complete account of the processes that may underlie these results is provided in the Discussion.
Judgments
Speakers' liking for the target. Data on subjects' liking for the target are presented in the first two sections of Table 6 . Each speaker was inferred to like the target more when the adjectives he or she used to describe the target were favorable than when they were unfavorable: In the case of the male speaker, 2.50 versus .08, i=Xl, 32) = 21.43, p < .01; in the case of the female speaker, 1.54 versus .04, F( 1, 32) = 7.04, p < .01.
Subjects' liking for speakers. Subjects' liking for the speakers is shown in the third and fourth sections of Table 6 . As in Experiment 1, subjects liked each speaker better when the speaker's trait adjective description of the target was favorable than when it was unfavorable: In the case of the male speaker, 1.67 versus -.46, F( 1,32) = 19.52, p < .01; in the case of the female speaker, 1.37 versus -.37, F( 1,32)= 10.96, p<. 01.
Subjects' liking for the target. Subjects' own liking for the target is shown in the last section of Table 6 . These data, like those obtained in Experiments 1 and 2, indicate that subjects did not base their evaluation of the target on the first (trait adjective) information presented. That is, subjects liked the target slightly less well when both speakers had described the target favorably (M = .83) than when they both had described him unfavorably (M = .92). In fact, their evaluations of the target were more favorable under both of these conditions (M = .87) than they were when the target had been described favorably by one speaker but not the other (M = -.65). The interaction implied by this latter difference was significant, F(l, 32) = 7.65, p < .01. This difference was confirmed by a post hoc analysis of the data from Experiments 1 and 2 alone, which revealed a three-way interaction of experiment and the favorableness of each speaker's characterization of the target, F\l, 64) = 4.52, p < .05.
The difference between these data and those obtained in Experiment 1 suggests that the concepts on which subjects based their target evaluations were not the same when they were asked to infer speakers' impressions of the target as when they were asked to form their own impressions of him.
Discussion
Subjects who were told to infer speakers' impressions of the target had generally better recall of behaviors a speaker mentioned that were inconsistent with this speaker's trait description of the target. When the two speakers' trait descriptions of the target were bipolar opposites, however, behaviors that confirmed the speaker's characterization of the target were better recalled. One reasonably parsimonious account of these data can be provided in terms of the processes that theoretically underlie the recall of inconsistent and consistent behaviors in other research on person memory . Specifically, subjects may have formed a concept of each speaker's liking for the target on the basis of the speaker's trait adjective description of him. When the speaker mentioned a behavior that was inconsistent with this concept, however, subjects attempted to understand why he or she did so. This additional cognitive processing, which theoretically led to the formation of associations between the inconsistent behavior and other behaviors, increased the accessibility of the inconsistent behavior in memory and consequently gave it a recall advantage later.
Additional factors came into play, however, when the two speakers' trait descriptions of the target were bipolar opposites.
Such descriptions cannot both be valid characterizations of the target's general personality. The confusion resulting from these contradictory descriptions may have stimulated subjects to consider more carefully the behaviors each speaker reported that confirmed the implications of his or her particular trait description. This bolstering process strengthened the behaviors' association with the concept around which they were organized, giving them a later recall advantage that overrode the effects produced by inconsistency resolution processes.
The question is why similar bolstering did not also occur when the two speakers' trait descriptions of the target were along different trait dimensions. Perhaps subjects in this condition simply assumed that the two speakers considered different criteria to be important in evaluating the target, and so they did not consider them to be inconsistent. Consequently, only when the descriptions were directly contradictory were subjects sufficiently uncertain of their validity to engage in bolstering.
The judgment data are generally compatible with the assumption that subjects used each speaker's trait description of the target to form a concept of the speaker's liking for him. They may have later based their liking for the speaker on this concept, reasoning that people who describe other persons (i.e., the target) favorably are more likable than people who disparage others. With one possible exception, however, subjects did not base their own liking for the target on the speakers' apparent liking for him. If anything, they based it on a partial review of the specific behaviors they could recall." The evaluative implications of these recalled behaviors may not have varied sufficiently over experimental conditions for their effects to be detected.
The one exception to this conclusion occurred when the male speaker described the target favorably and the female speaker described him unfavorably. Subjects liked the target less under this condition than under any other. Any interpretation of this unexpected result must remain speculative. Perhaps the above combination of target descriptions activated a stereotype of a male chauvinist whose attitudes and behavior typically meet with the approval of his male cohorts but are considered offensive by women. Such a person may be generally disliked by both male and female subjects. If this is the case, however, the stereotype is apparently activated and applied only when subjects have a set to think specifically about speakers' impressions of the target, and does not occur when subjects are told to form 1 ' The correlation between target evaluations and the proportions of recalled behaviors that had favorable implications was negligible in this experiment (r = -.007). Note, however, that an interpretation of these correlations as indications of the effects of recalled behaviors on judgments requires at least two assumptions. First, the information integration rule underlying subjects' subjective computation of the implications of the recalled behavior is averaging rather than summation (or neither). The second assumption is that all of the recalled behaviors were taken into account in this computation, rather than only a subset of them. Although the latter assumption is rather implausible, there is no a priori way to determine which and how many behaviors in the set of those recalled were the ones that composed the subset that subjects actually used. For these reasons, these correlations do not necessarily disconfirm the assumption that judgments were based at least in part on such a subset. their own impression of the target. (These effects were not apparent in Experiment 1.)
General Discussion
The major results obtained in the present three experiments can be summarized as follows:
1. When subjects were told to form an impression of the target person described in the conversation they heard (Experiment 1), they had better recall of behaviors that were inconsistent with the female speaker's trait description of the target than behaviors that were consistent with it. In contrast, the consistency of behaviors with the male speaker's description of the target had little effect on the ease of recalling them.
2. When subjects were told to form impressions of the two speakers (Experiment 2), they had better recall of the behaviors a speaker mentioned that were inconsistent with the trait description provided by the other speaker, and this was true regardless of whether the two speakers' characterizations of the target were similar.
3. When subjects were told to infer each speaker's impression of the target (Experiment 3), they had better recall of behaviors that were inconsistent with the trait description provided by the speaker who mentioned them unless the two speakers' trait descriptions were bipolar opposites. In this latter condition, behaviors that were consistent with the description provided by the speaker who mentioned them had a recall advantage.
4. Subjects' inferences that the speakers liked the target generally increased with the favorableness of the speakers' trait descriptions of him. However, subjects' own liking for the target did not. In not one of the three experiments did subjects appear to use the speakers' initial trait descriptions of the target as a basis for their own evaluation of him. If subjects formed any concept of the target at the time they listened to the conversation, they apparently based it on the behavioral information.
5. The effects of speakers' trait descriptions on subjects' liking for the speakers themselves also varied over experiments. When subjects were told either to form impressions of the target or to infer speakers' impressions of him, their liking for the speakers increased with the favorableness of the speakers' descriptions of the target persons. When subjects were explicitly told to form impressions of the speakers, however, this was true only when the two speakers' descriptions were evaluatively dissimilar and therefore, were likely to reflect a characteristic of the speaker rather than of the target himself.
Our results disconfirm several alternative hypotheses concerning the nature of the representations that were formed and the use of these representations to make judgments. No existing formulation of person memory and judgment can account completely for these results. Given certain assumptions, however, an associative network metaphor of the sort employed by Srull and Wyer (1989; can be used to conceptualize the kinds of cognitive representations that may have been formed under the conditions we investigated, and to pinpoint various assumptions concerning the processes that led to their construction. Srull and Wyer (1989; see also Hamilton et al., 1980) assumed that when subjects form impressions of a person from behavioral information, they encode the behaviors in terms of the trait concepts they exemplify, forming trait-behavior clusters of the sort shown in Figure 1 . If these clusters are later retrieved for use in recalling the behaviors, the recalled behaviors should be clustered according to the traits they exemplified. This clustering was evident in Experiments 2 and 3. However, it was not evident in Experiment 1, where subjects were instructed to form an impression of the target person. Thus, the trait encoding processes that Srull and Wyer assumed to be an initial step in person impression formation on the basis of behavior information did not appear to occur when information was presented in the context of a conversation. They were detected only when subjects were instructed to focus on the speakers (i.e., to infer speakers' impressions or to form impressions of the speakers themselves).
Trait-Based Representations
In addition to the organization of behaviors by trait category, there was some evidence that subjects organized the behaviors into evaluative categories. This was true in all three experiments. However, it was most apparent in Experiment 2, where subjects were told to form impressions of the speakers. In this study, the behaviors the speakers mentioned constituted speech acts that may not have been interpreted in terms of specific traits but rather, were encoded as simply "favorable" or "unfavorable." Thus, these evaluative concepts may function in much the same way as descriptive trait concepts.
Evaluation-Based Representations Experiment 1
Subjects who were told to form an impression of the target did not base this impression on the speakers' initial trait descriptions of him. Rather, they appear to have used these descriptions to form concepts of either the speakers' liking for the target or the general likeableness of the speakers themselves, and to have organized the behavioral information in terms of these concepts. At least two types of representations are compatible with the recall data we obtained.
First, subjects formed evaluative concepts pertaining to both speakers on the basis of their trait descriptions of the target. However, they organized the behaviors that were mentioned during the conversation around a concept that was based only on the female speaker's description. When subjects encountered behaviors that were evaluatively inconsistent with this concept, they thought about them in relation to other behaviors that were mentioned in order to reconcile their inconsistency, thereby forming associations between the behaviors. The representations that would theoretically result from this activity, which are different when the two speaker's characterizations of the target are evaluatively similar than when they are dissimilar, would resemble those shown in Figure 2a , where S F is a concept pertaining to the female speaker; C F and I F are behaviors mentioned by the female speaker that are consistent and inconsistent, respectively, with the female speaker's characterization of the target; and C M and I M are behaviors mentioned by the male a. Single-concept representations These two representations cannot be distinguished on the basis of recall data alone. However, the dual-concept representation is more consistent with the judgment data and also with the data obtained in Experiments 2 and 3, as indicated below.
Experiment 2
Subjects who were told to form impressions of the speakers presumably organized the behaviors around evaluative concepts of the speakers who mentioned them. Having formed their er's liking for the target on the basis of the speaker's trait description of him. They may then have encoded and organized the behaviors the speaker mentioned with reference to this evaluative concept. When the speaker mentioned a behavior that was inconsistent with his or her apparent liking for the target, subjects may have tried to understand why. In doing so, they may have thought about the behavior description in relation to other behaviors that both speakers described. The representation that would result from these cognitive activities resembles that shown in Figure 4a . When the two speakers' trait descriptions of the target were bipolar opposites, however, both could not be valid characterizations of the target's general personality. In this case, an additional factor may come into play. Subjects in this condition appear to have thought more extensively about behaviors that each speaker mentioned that confirmed the validity of the concept they formed of the speaker's impression. This "bolstering" activity may have strengthened these behaviors' association with the concept to an extent that led them to gain a recall advantage over the inconsistent ones. The representation implied by these processes has the form shown in Figure 4b .
In summary, the cognitive representations formed from the information we presented in the three instructional conditions can be conceptualized after the fact within the framework of the concept of a given speaker, they apparently thought more extensively about behaviors the other speaker mentioned that were inconsistent with the trait description on which this concept was based. (These behaviors presumably supported their assumption that the trait description reflected the speaker's general likableness rather than attributes of the target person.) This cognitive activity gave these behaviors a recall advantage of the behaviors when subjects were later asked to remember the information they had received.
The cognitive activities that produced this recall advantage could be of two types. First, subjects may have thought about the behavior in relation to other behaviors the speakers mentioned. Alternatively, the recall advantage of the statements could reflect the occurrence of bolstering. That is, subjects may have thought about the behavior statements in relation to their concept of the speaker who did not mention them (i.e., the concept whose validity is confirmed by these behaviors), producing direct associations between the behaviors and this concept as well as the concept of the speaker who mentioned the behaviors. The relative merits of these possibilities cannot be evaluated on the basis of the data available. However, the second is more compatible with the interpretation we have given to our findings. The representations implied by this second alternative are shown in Figure 3 .
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, subjects were instructed to infer impressions of the target. The judgment data support the assumption that subjects did indeed form evaluative concepts of each speak- Srull and Wyer model. However, representations other than the ones we have proposed are possible in some cases. The nature of these representations cannot be predicted a priori. Furthermore, the model is not at all helpful in understanding why the cognitive activities underlying the construction of these representations actually occurred.
Judgment Processes
Of the various results reported in this article, the judgment data are the most problematic for existing models of person memory and judgment. No existing model can account for these data in their entirety without the addition of several ad hoc and post hoc assumptions. According to the Srull and Wyer (1989) model, for example, subjects who are asked to make a judgment theoretically search for a representation whose central concept has direct implications for it. Then, if one is found, they base their judgment on this concept without considering the implications of the behaviors associated with it. Otherwise, they base their judgment on the indirect implications of the concept that defines the representation they have identified, along with the implications of a subset of the behaviors contained in it.
These assumptions alone cannot account completely for the judgment data we obtained in any of the three experiments. For example, our interpretation of the results of Experiment 1 assumes that subjects used the speakers' initial trait descriptions of the target to form evaluative concepts of the speakers and that they organized the behavioral information around these concepts. If this is the case, the evidence that these trait descriptions had a positive influence on both subjects' liking for the speakers and their inferences that the speakers liked the target but not on subjects' own liking for the target would be consistent with Srull and Wyer's (1989) judgment postulates. On the other hand, the contrast effect of speakers' trait descriptions of the target on subjects' target evaluations, albeit of marginal reliability, cannot be accounted for by the model without the addition of several ad hoc assumptions.
A second suggestion that speaker-based concepts had contrast effects on target ratings was evident in Experiment 2, in which subjects were told explicitly to form concepts of the speakers at the time they heard the conversation. However, additional factors appeared to enter into the judgment process in this experiment. For example, the effects of speakers' descriptions of the target on subjects' judgments of the speakers were particularly pronounced when the two speakers' descriptions were evaluatively dissimilar. We interpreted this as an indication that the two speakers' descriptions of the target were more often attributed to their own personalities than to the target when these descriptions evaluatively differed. Evidence of similar attributions was not obtained in Experiments 1 and 3, however. Other unexpected contingencies in subjects' judgments occurred in Experiment 3. The judgment assumptions made by Srull and Wyer (1989) are incapable of predicting these effects or conceptualizing clearly the conditions in which they occur.
Concluding Remarks
The processing of trait and behavior information about a person is quite well understood when this information is presented out of context, in a randomized list. However, the presentation of similar information in an informal conversation adds considerable complexity to these processes. This complexity may result in large part from the fact that the information presented has implications for attributes of the speakers as well as those of the target and that subjects appear to take these implications into account in responding to the information. Even under the fairly constrained conditions in which our initial set of studies was conducted, a number of unexpected phenomena were identified that cannot be accounted for by existing theory and research on person memory and judgment.
No research can be conducted and interpreted in a vacuum. In the preliminary research we have reported, the impression formation processes assumed by existing person memory models provided a useful heuristic device for conceptualizing the impressions on the basis of conversations. However, these models may be limited in their ultimate ability to capture these processes. The representations that are formed under the conditions we investigated clearly differ from those that are typically formed under the conditions investigated in previous research. Moreover, the processes that underlie the use of the representations to make judgments are much more complex than current models presently assume. Indeed, these models may prove to be quite inapplicable once further constraints on the information presented are removed. Therefore, pending further research, present models of person memory and judgment should perhaps be evaluated primarily in terms of their ability to stimulate questions that might otherwise not be identified rather than their ability to provide answers to these questions. Their ultimate utility in the present research domain remains to be seen.
